Speciesism

Speciesism

The concept of speciesism is a central one when it comes to examining and evaluating the moral, social, political and legal consideration of nonhuman animals. Speciesism is the discrimination of those who do not belong to a certain species. The term was coined by Richard Ryder (2010/1970) in 1970 and is akin to similar ones used to describe other forms of discrimination, such as racism or sexism. Speciesist views are widespread today, and they have important consequences. The most relevant one is that nonhuman animals suffer and die massively due to human actions and omissions. Those who oppose speciesism accept antispeciesism (Giroux 2020), which differs from nonspeciesism, which is the mere absence of speciesism.

A more detailed definition of speciesism

Given that speciesism is a form of discrimination, it is first necessary to understand discrimination itself in order to grasp the meaning of speciesism. There are several key points to clarify in this regard.

Discrimination is a comparative concept. Discrimination occurs when someone is treated or considered worse than others (Lippert-Rasmussen 2014). Actual harm is not necessary for discrimination to be present. Take the example of a group of people who donate money to provide aid in Europe and Africa but give more to Europeans than Africans based on the idea that people with lighter skin are more important than those with darker skin. By donating to Africans, these people are not harming them; they are benefiting them. Still, these people are discriminating against them in a racist way. Similarly, consider a vegan who refrains from harming animals but only donates to help humans, not other animals, thinking that we should always help members of our species first. This vegan holds a speciesist view.

Discrimination involves a lack of justification in some sense. If someone is treated worse than others for entirely justified reasons, this treatment need not be an act of discrimination. For example, this may happen if a state invests less in the provision of services for wealthier people than in that for those with fewer resources.

Discrimination can occur if you treat someone worse than others, or if you consider them worse than others. The clearest cases of discrimination are those in which the victims are actually treated worse. However, imagine the case of someone who wants certain individuals to be treated worse than others for no justified reason (e.g., out of a prejudiced contempt), but who never has the chance to interact with those individuals. She would still be discriminating against them. Similarly, think of someone who believes that racism is wrong but who unknowingly hurts the feelings of victims of it by using racist expressions without being aware of them. Those peple whose feelings are hurt would be still suffering discrimination. These two examples suggest that someone can be discriminated against both by how others consider them and by how others treat them.

Having explained what discrimination consists of, we can now conclude that speciesism can be defined as the unjustified unfavorable treatment or consideration of beings that do not belong or are not classified as belonging to a certain species (or group of species) (Horta 2010; Albersmeier 2021). Below are some clarifications regarding what this definition implies.

The definition of speciesism does not require a critique of the concept of species, though it can be reinforced by it. The concept of species is problematic and very difficult to define (Richards 2010; Zachos 2016). It could thus be argued that speciesist attitudes may be rejected due to the lack of a solid biological basis. Nevertheless, the definition of speciesism can remain neutral on this issue. Similarly, the rejection of speciesism is compatible with both the acceptance and the rejection of the idea that species constitute natural kinds, though the latter would give extra reasons to challenge speciesism.

Speciesism is not the same as misothery. The attitude of hatred toward nonhuman animals has been called misothery (Mason 2009). It would be speciesist to have such an attitude toward nonhuman animals, but not toward humans. However, one can be speciesist without feeling any hostility toward nonhuman animals—simply by giving less consideration to their interests than to those of humans. Indeed, this is the kind of attitude displayed by many people.

Speciesism is a phenomenon with many dimensions. It is also important to note that a form of discrimination such as speciesism does not manifest itself only at the level of individual attitudes and behaviors. On the one hand, speciesism is the idea that we should treat certain animals worse than others, as well as the desire and intention to do so, the actions caused by such an intention, and the psychological disposition that moves us to do so (Caviola et al. 2019). On the other hand, speciesism is a collective phenomenon. It is a shared ideology that leads speciesists to think as they do. Moreover, the current socioeconomic, political, and legal institutionalization of speciesist practices, which encourages people to have speciesist attitudes, should be seen as yet another instance of speciesism. The current exploitation of nonhuman animals as resources, and the lack of institutions to assist them in the sorts of situations where humans would be assisted, are instances of collective and systemic speciesism.

Anthropocentric speciesism is only one type of speciesism. The most common form of speciesism is the one that discriminates against all nonhuman animals in relation to humans, which we can call anthropocentric speciesism. However, any form of discrimination against those who do not belong to a given species is speciesist (Dunayer 2004). Thus, it is also speciesist, for example, to discriminate against pigs, chickens, and fish compared to dogs and cats, or rodents and crustaceans in comparison with pandas and blue whales. Discriminating against small animals compared to large animals — a form of discrimination that has been termed “sizeism” (Morton 2009) — can also be considered a form of speciesism. 

Most people hold several speciesist positions at the same time. It is very common for humans to discriminate against certain nonhuman animals compared to others in different ways and to discriminate against all of them compared to humans. Some animals, especially invertebrates, suffer several types of speciesist discrimination simultaneously because they are not human, not large, not scarce, not considered aesthetically attractive, etc. (Knutsson 2016; Villamor Iglesias 2021; Invertebrate Welfare 2022).

Anthropocentrism and speciesism

Anthropocentrism can be defined as the worse treatment or consideration of those who are not human. This is commonly interpreted to mean that anthropocentrism is the position that favors members of the species Homo sapiens. Strictly speaking, however, the word “human” does not denote only that species. Rather, it denotes the whole of the human genus—Homo—to which other species, such as Homo erectus and Homo habilis, also belonged. On this point, we should note that, if those non-Homo sapiens humans had not become extinct, there would surely be many speciesist people who would discriminate against them. Therefore, it would probably be more accurate to describe the attitudes of many people as Homo sapiens-centric, rather than anthropocentric.

Those who hold anthropocentric views have argued that the worse consideration of nonhuman animals is justified. If this were correct, anthropocentrism would not be a form of speciesism because, as we have seen above, for some consideration or treatment to be speciesist, it must be unjustifiably worse. This idea can be defended in several ways.

Definitional defenses of anthropocentrism. Some people claim that the interests of human beings must be paramount compared to those of others by definition—that is, without providing any argument to support such an idea (Diamond 1978; Williams 2006).

Nondefinitional positions. According to other views, human beings possess certain attributes that supposedly justify giving them priority over other beings. These attributes can be of the following different types:

Capacities and other features whose possession can be verified. Sometimes, the attributes appealed to in order to defend anthropocentrism are intrinsic ones whose possession can be empirically verified. In most cases, they are cognitive capacities or related ones (Descartes 1987 [1637]); Leahy 1991). 

• Relationships whose possession can be verified. Other attributes are extrinsic and consist of relations whose possession can also be empirically verified, such as relations of sympathy or power (Narveson 1977; Becker 1983).

• Attributes that cannot be corroborated. In other cases, it is argued that human beings (and only human beings) have certain attributes whose possession cannot be verified or falsified in any way. These may include (i) certain characteristics, such as the possession of a superior status, and (ii) certain special relations, such as a privileged link to a deity (Reichmann 2000; Machan 2004). These alleged attributes are independent of human beings’ observable capacities and relations.

• Combinations that include two or more of the above criteria. Finally, combinations of attributes have also been considered. For example, some have argued that to merit full consideration, we must possess some specific capacity or, if not, be in a certain relationship (Scanlon 1998). Others have claimed that what matters is being a member of a species whose individuals often have certain intellectual capacities (Cohen 1986; Schmidtz 1998; Kagan 2019). Still others maintain that what matters is that we have the capacity to establish certain relationships, such as collaborative social ties (Goldman 2001).

It would not be speciesist to give priority to human beings and disregard other sentient beings if any of the above defenses of anthropocentrism were correct. However, several arguments have been presented against them.

Begging the question. Defenses of anthropocentrism that appeal to criteria whose fulfillment cannot be verified or that are merely definitional assume in their premises the conclusion they seek to prove (Singer 2023 [1975]; Animal Ethics 2020). Thus, they cannot be adequately justified as they cannot demonstrate that such a conclusion is correct.

Species overlap. Another argument that has been discussed at length in the literature challenges the views that appeal to criteria whose possession can be verified. The core of this argument is that there is no nondefinitional criterion that all humans and no other animals meet. Not all humans have complex intellectual abilities (some of them have less sophisticated cognitive capacities than certain nonhuman animals). Similarly, we do not have sympathetic relationships with all humans, and many humans find themselves in situations of weakness where they have no power and are at the mercy of the will of others (think of orphan babies without anyone to take care of them). This means that these criteria do not draw a dividing line between all human beings and nonhuman animals. It also means that accepting these criteria is at odds with the idea that all human beings must be respected, meaning that such criteria cannot justify anthropocentrism (Pluhar 1995).

This is the argument from species overlap. It has also often been called the “argument from marginal cases” (Narveson 1977). However, this designation has been criticized as inadequate since the lack of certain capacities or relationships does not make someone marginal within a species (Horta 2014).

Reduction of combined views to their components. Defenses of anthropocentrism that combine different types of arguments can be evaluated by considering whether each of those arguments is correct. For example, the view that moral consideration is based on either capacities or relations will be sound if both criteria are valid. However, as we have seen, both are challenged by the argument from species overlap. The same applies to those views that make moral considerability depend on the capacity to have certain relations. As for the view that the criterion for moral consideration is based on mere membership of a species whose individuals typically have certain capacities ends up relying on a definitional view, which can be challenged as question begging.  

Impartiality. According to another argument, which we might refer to as “the argument from impartiality,” defenses of the priority of human interests are unfair because they are biased (Jaquet 2021; 2022). We would not accept them if we thought impartially on this issue. We can consider this point with a couple of thought experiments. Suppose that we had to live the lives of all animals, human and nonhuman, one after the other. Or suppose that before we were born, we did not know whether we were going to be human beings or another kind of animal (bearing in mind that the probability of being born as a nonhuman animal is much higher than that of being born as a human because there are many more nonhuman animals than humans). Now, imagine that we could choose which world we would prefer to live in—one in which humans accept anthropocentrism or one in which they reject it. Probably, no one thinking honestly would conclude that the world where anthropocentrism is present would be preferable (VanDeVeer 1979; Rowlands 2016).

Relevance. Another argument is based on the idea that our decisions should be made on the basis of what is relevant to the object of those decisions. The argument continues by stating that decisions about what entities should be morally considerable are choices about which entities will be taken into account when our decisions can harm them or benefit them (Bernstein 1998; 2015). In light of this, the argument concludes that because sentience is what is relevant for being able to be harmed or benefited by the actions and omissions of others, it should also be the relevant criterion for moral considerability (Singer 2023 [1975]; Sapontzis 1987). This argument can thus be named the “argument from relevance” (Horta 2018).

If these arguments are correct (or if the fourth, the fifth, or a combination of the first three is), the defenses of anthropocentrism fail and are speciesist. Moreover, these arguments give us reasons to support sentience as a criterion for moral considerability. This would lead to giving moral consideration not to all biological organisms classified as animals but to all sentient animals, including vertebrates (Gregory 2004; Broom 2014) and many invertebrates (Mather 2001; Carere & Mather 2019; Villamor Iglesias 2021). Thus, this criterion would not have been arbitrarily designed to grant moral consideration to animals, and it would exclude those that do not possess the physiology necessary for sentience (e.g., sponges, which lack a nervous system). It would also imply that should other sentient beings exist in the future, such entities would have to be equally considered from a moral point of view (Animal Ethics 2020; Reese Anthis & Paez 2021). This would include new species of genetically engineered animals and artificial conscious entities (Harris & Reese Anthis 2021). The same criteria that lead us to give moral consideration to animals would compel us to prevent future scenarios in which those artificial forms of sentience suffer (Vinding 2020; Baumann 2022).

It is also important to note that whoever disregards animals not on the basis of their species but because they lack certain intellectual or related capacities is still a speciesist. This can be understood if we consider the issue of bias among human beings. Imagine someone who discriminates against women by alleging, for example, that they do not have the same physical strength as men. Clearly, this would be as sexist as discriminating against women simply because of their sex. The same is true of speciesism (Albersmeier 2021). Denying this in the case of speciesism would imply accepting a stricter criterion for considering a position to be speciesist than the one accepted in the case of discrimination that affects exclusively human beings. This would, in turn, be speciesist.

Finally, the positions that advocate the indirect protection of nonhuman animals only because this would presumably benefit humans are also speciesist (Kant 1991: 443; Wilson 2002). Ultimately, these views do not really grant moral consideration to nonhuman animals, but only to humans.

Speciesism in practice

Speciesism means that nonhuman animals are harmed in many ways. For instance, they are used in massive numbers for the production of animal products and services (Singer, 2023 [1975]; Francione, 2000). In most cases, animals endure significant suffering and are deprived of their lives. Vertebrates affected in this manner are estimated to number around two billion, while invertebrates may reach several tens of billions (Waldhorn et al. 2023). These figures are several orders of magnitude higher than the total human population. Moreover, as new methods emerge that enable extensive harm to sentient beings (Animal Ethics 2020; Baumann 2022), in the future, especially in the long term, this number could become much higher.

This harm significantly outweighs the benefits that humans derive from animals (Cavalieri 2001; McMahan 2008; Vinding 2020). Many people would likely consider these effects unacceptable if humans were the ones to suffer them. Indifference towards those harms may thus reflect speciesist attitudes. Some argue that the harmful use of animals is acceptable if efforts are made to reduce their suffering (cf. Francione 2000; Haynes 2008). Yet as long as these views condone harm if the ones suffering it are not humans, they would still be instances of speciesism. Importantly, speciesism allows one to consider nonhuman animals to some degree, provided that human interests are given higher consideration (Zamir 2005). Therefore, being against speciesism gives us strong reasons to be in favor of veganism—the position consisting in avoiding doing harm to animals, (Vegan Society, n.d.; Francione 2000; Bruers 2015; Horta 2022 [2017]), even though the opposite is not the case, as someone can be a vegan and a speciesist.

Furthermore, speciesism also explains why nonhuman animals are not aided in situations where we would readily help humans. This is evidenced by animal advocacy receiving far less support than advocacy for humans. Another example is the lack of concern for animals that are not in captivity (in urban, industrial, agricultural, forest, aquatic, and other environments). This issue is often linked to the notion that wild animals must suffer and die if this is necessary to meet environmental goals (Sagoff 1984; Shelton 2004). This idea stems from viewing wild animals not as sentient individuals that merit moral consideration but as ecosystem or species components (Dorado 2015). Once again, this idea does not extend to humans.

This opinion has important consequences as wild animals suffer and die in very high numbers not only due to human causes but also natural ones, which can be equally harmful. Wild animals are often harmed by a combination of anthropogenic and natural factors (Animal Ethics 2020; Cunha 2022). The natural ones include weather conditions, hunger, malnutrition, thirst, diseases, conflicts with other animals, parasitism, and accidents (Johannsen 2020; Horta 2022 [2017]; Faria 2023). The magnitude of the harm these factors inflict on animals becomes clear if we consider that the vast majority of them die very young, often undergoing great amounts of suffering (Tomasik 2010 [2009]; Hecht 2021). Moreover, their numbers likely reach the trillions, exceeding both humans and animals used by humans (Tomasik 2015b [2009]). We may think that there is nothing we can do about this problem; however, many wild animals could be aided. There are several ways in which this is being done, such as rescuing animals that are trapped or affected by natural disasters and weather events, constructing shelters and burrows for vulnerable animals, and setting up hospitals for injured, sick, or orphaned animals (Animal Ethics 2020).

If nonhuman animals are morally considerable, it seems that we have robust reasons to support actions such as these as well as promote the study of how to develop more and better ways of helping animals living beyond direct human control (Nussbaum 2006; Faria & Páez 2015). Because of this, a new interdisciplinary field of biology has been proposed that can improve our understanding of the natural harms experienced by animals and explore ways to mitigate such harm (Ng 1995; Faria & Horta 2019; Soryl et al. 2021).

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Note: An earlier version of this article appeared in Portuguese in 2021 with the title “Especismo.” This revised version has been expanded, and its references have been updated. Some of the ideas in this article are explained in more detail in in Horta, O. & Albersmeier, F. (2020), “Defining Speciesism”, Philosophy Compass, 15/11, 1-9.

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about the author

Oscar Horta is a philosopher at the University of Santiago de Compostela, where he leads the Wild Animal Ethics project. He's also the co-founder of the charity Animal Ethics and the author of Making a Stand for Animals (Routledge, 2022).