Are individuals or ecological wholes what matter? Yes.

There tends to be strong disagreement in animal and environmental ethics between individualists (1), who hold that individuals are the primary units of moral analysis, and ecocentrists (2), who hold that ecological wholes are the primary units of moral analysis. These disagreements are partly theoretical, concerning which beings merit moral consideration and why. They are also partly practical, concerning which beings merit priority when, for example, the needs of individual animals conflict with the needs of the species or ecosystems that contain them. 

Of course, even when ethicists disagree about whether animals or ecological wholes are the primary units of moral analysis, they can still agree that animals and ecological wholes have a lot of value. For example, even if individual animals are what matter for their own sakes, ecological wholes can still matter a lot for the sake of the animals they contain. Similarly, even if ecological wholes are what matter for their own sakes, individual animals can still matter a lot for the sake of the ecological wholes they constitute.

Likewise, even when ethicists disagree about whether to prioritize animals or ecological wholes in cases where their interests diverge, they can still agree about what to do in cases where their interests converge. For example, they can agree that practices like factory farming, deforestation, and the wildlife trade are morally wrong, since these practices not only kill trillions of individual animals per year but also consume land and water, produce waste and pollution, and accelerate biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse.

My aim in this essay is to identify another area of possible convergence for ethicists who disagree about these issues. I will suggest that the concept ‘primary unit of moral analysis’ is ambiguous, and that when we disambiguate it, we can identify a plausible view according to which animals are the primary units of moral analysis (or, at least, are closer to playing that role) in one important respect and ecological wholes are the primary units of moral analysis (or, at least, are closer to playing this role) in another important respect.

My discussion will rest on an analogy between science and ethics. When we ask which entities are the primary units of scientific analysis, we may be asking a metaphysical question about which beings are the most basic units of analysis, and in this case, the answer may be smaller entities, like particles or waves. But we may also be asking a methodological question about which entities are the most helpful units of analysis in a given context, and in this case, the answer may be larger entities, with the details varying from case to case.

Similarly, I will suggest that when we ask which beings are the primary units of moral analysis, we may be asking a normative question about which beings are the most basic units of analysis, and in this case, the answer may be smaller beings like individuals or their parts. But we may also be asking a methodological question about which beings are the most helpful units of analysis in a given context, and in this case, the answer may be larger beings, including – when we ask moral questions at ecological scales – ecological wholes. 

I will also suggest that this distinction allows for stronger convergence between individualism and ecocentrism than, for instance, mere recognition of instrumental or contributory value do. For example, this distinction creates space for the idea that animals are closer to the foundations of moral theory but that ecological wholes are closer to the foundations of moral practice in some contexts – as well as for the idea that ecological wholes have a kind of irreducible value that, despite not being foundational, takes priority in some cases.

To be clear, I will not be suggesting that the distinction between normative and methodological concerns can resolve all disagreements between individualists and ecocentrists. Some ethicists might disagree about which beings are the primary units of moral analysis in both of these senses. And even if not, they might disagree about related issues, including whether the moral status of ecological wholes is fully reducible to the moral status of individuals, or whether individuals or ecological wholes should take priority in particular cases.

Still, this distinction might be able to resolve some disagreements between individualists and ecocentrists. Some ethicists might agree that individual animals are the primary units of moral analysis in theory and that ecological wholes are the primary units of moral analysis in practice, in relevant contexts. And insofar as ethicists continue to disagree, this distinction can at least help us to sharpen these disagreements, providing us with a richer framework for debating the moral status of animals and ecological wholes.

Before I begin, I should add a note about the basis of moral standing. In general, a being has moral standing when they morally matter for their own sake, in virtue of facts about them. Philosophers typically interpret debates about which beings are the primary units of moral analysis as debates about which beings have moral standing, with some ethicists accepting individualist views (say, that sentient beings or agents matter for their own sakes) and others accepting ecocentric views (say, that species or ecosystems matter for their own sakes).

However, these options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some ethicists accept pluralist views about moral standing, according to which multiple properties and relations suffice for moral standing. For example, one might hold that sentient beings, agents, species, and ecosystems all morally matter for their own sakes, in distinctive ways. Sentient beings and agents have experiences and motivations that warrant compassion and respect, respectively, and species and ecosystems have a kind of integrity that warrants preservation.

We might also accept a pluralist view due to moral and/or scientific uncertainty. If I feel unsure whether sentience, agency, or ecological integrity is sufficient for moral standing, perhaps I should treat them as though they are. And if I feel unsure whether particular beings count as sentient, agential, or ecologically integrated, perhaps I should treat them as though they do. In this case, I would accept a pluralist view not because I think that individuals and ecological wholes do matter for their own sakes, but rather because I think that they might.

If we allow for the possibility that this kind of pluralist view about moral standing is correct, then we create additional space for convergence. Suppose I think that an individualist theory of moral standing is likely to be correct and you think that an ecocentric theory is likely to be correct. In this case, we might both still think that each theory has a reasonable, non-negligible chance of being correct. Thus, we might disagree about which beings merit priority, but we might at least agree that they both merit consideration, in the spirit of caution and humility.

However, for present purposes I will set this kind of pluralist view about moral standing aside and simply stipulate that an individualist view is correct, so that I can make the following point: Even if, say, only sentient beings or agents matter for their own sakes and only individuals are sentient or agential, we can still vindicate the idea that ecological wholes are the primary units of moral analysis in important respects. If we then bring pluralism about moral standing back into the picture, that will only make the case for partial convergence stronger.

Since the distinction that I want to unpack is more familiar in science than in ethics, I start by discussing this distinction in science, and how it creates space for smaller and larger beings to be the primary units of scientific analysis in important respects. I then, in more detail, discuss how this distinction can work in ethics, and how it can create space for similar possibilities. I close by explaining how this distinction might be able to resolve some disagreements between individualists and ecocentrists, while clarifying others. 

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Consider how this distinction works in science. On one interpretation, to ask which entities are the primary units of scientific analysis is to ask a theoretical, metaphysical question about which entities are the most basic units of scientific analysis. There are different ways to explain this idea, but for present purposes, we can say that one kind of entity (A) is a more basic unit of scientific analysis than another (B) when A is part of what constitutes B, and so the physical properties and relations of B depend in some way on the physical properties and relations of A.

For example, individual animals are more basic than species and ecosystems in this sense, since animals are part of what constitute species and ecosystems, and so the physical properties and relations of species and ecosystems depend in a particular way on those of individual animals. Similarly, particles or waves are more basic than animals in this sense, since, once again, particles or waves are part of what constitute animals, and so the physical properties and relations of animals depend in a particular way on those of particles or waves. 

Importantly, we can agree that some beings are more basic than others in this sense while disagreeing about the details. For example, some philosophers think that facts about larger beings like species and ecosystems fully reduce to facts about smaller beings like particles or waves. On this view, a complete theory of quantum physics can fully explain all phenomena at larger scales of reality. Yes, we might find it difficult to use quantum physics alone to understand, say, evolution, but at least in principle, such an understanding is possible.

Alternatively, we might think that facts about larger beings like species and ecosystems depend on facts about smaller beings like particles or waves without fully reducing to them, since there can be “emergent facts” at different scales of reality. On this view, a complete theory of quantum physics is not able to explain all physical phenomena at larger scales of reality. Instead, we need different kinds of science – physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, ecology, astronomy, and so on – to explain different phenomena at different scales.

However, while this disagreement matters a lot, it does not undermine the theoretical, metaphysical primacy of smaller beings like particles or waves. Whether or not we think that facts about species and ecosystems fully reduce to facts about particles or waves, we can still think that facts about species and ecosystems depend in a particular way on facts about particles or waves, and that it makes sense to classify the latter as closer to the foundations of reality than the former to that extent. That is all that I mean to be saying at this point. 

On another interpretation, to ask which beings are the primary units of scientific analysis is to ask a practical, methodological question about which beings are the most helpful units of scientific analysis in a given context. There are different ways to explain this idea too, but for present purposes, we can say that one kind of entity (A) is a more helpful unit of scientific analysis than another (B) when an analysis of A is a better methodological starting point than an analysis of B, for purposes of answering a given scientific question.  

For example, even if facts about species and ecosystems depend on facts about particles or waves, an analysis of species and ecosystems is still a more helpful starting point than facts about particles or waves when we need to explain evolution. And that would remain true even if facts about species and ecosystems fully reduced to facts about particles or waves. That is, even if a complete theory of quantum physics could fully explain biodiversity loss in principle, other kinds of science would still be more helpful for creatures like us in practice.

Importantly, which kinds of beings are the more helpful units of analysis in this sense is a contextual matter. Yes, humans naturally experience the world in terms of entities like plants, animals, tables, and chairs. As a result, we naturally explain and predict phenomena at this scale by default; for instance, when I walk my dog each day, I navigate my environment by thinking about what, say, cars, trucks, humans, and dogs will do, not by thinking about what, say, car- and truck- and human- and dog-shaped sets of particles or waves will do.

However, even if entities like plants, animals, tables, and chairs are generally the most helpful units of scientific analysis for creatures like us, larger or smaller entities can sometimes play this role as well. If I want to explain what I saw in a telescope, then I should think primarily in terms of planets or stars. Similarly, if I want to explain what I saw in a cloud chamber, then I should think primarily in terms of particles or waves. In these and other ways, which kinds of beings are the most helpful units of scientific analysis can vary from case to case. 

This discussion reveals an important sense in which individuals and ecological wholes can both be primary units of scientific analysis. On one hand, individuals are the more basic units of analysis in theory, as well as the more helpful units of analysis for creatures like us in most contexts in practice. However, ecological wholes are the more helpful units of analysis for creatures like us in some contexts in practice, since when we think about science at ecological scales, we need to think primarily in systemic terms, not individualist terms. 

In my view, the same distinction applies in ethics. On one interpretation, to ask which beings are the primary units of moral analysis is to ask a theoretical, normative question about which beings are the most basic units of moral analysis. The general idea is the same as before: One kind of moral agent or patient (3) is a more basic unit of moral analysis than another when the first kind of moral agent or patient is part of what constitutes the second, and so the moral properties and relations of the second depend in some way on those of the first.

For example, each human being is an individual moral agent and patient, with our own duties and rights. But when we interact in particular ways, we also form collective moral agents and patients, with further, shared sets of duties and rights. In these cases, individuals and collectives are both units of moral analysis, but individuals are the more basic units of moral analysis, since individuals are what constitute collectives, and the moral properties and relations of collectives depend in some way on those of their individual members.

Some ethicists also think that the same can be true of individuals and our spatial or temporal parts. For instance, some ethicists think that insofar as our brain regions can have their own thoughts and feelings, they can count as separate moral agents and patients, with their own duties and rights. How, then, do individual humans become moral agents or patients? In the same way that collectives do. When our brain regions interact in particular ways, they constitute us as individual moral agents and patients, with individual duties and rights.

Similarly, some ethicists (including me) think that insofar as our past, present, and future selves can have their own thoughts and feelings, they count as separate moral agents and patients, with their own duties and rights, too. How, then, do temporally extended individual humans become moral agents and patients? At this point you should be able to guess: When our past, present, and future selves interact in particular ways, they constitute us as temporally extended individual moral agents or patients, with temporally extended individual duties or rights.

To be clear, not everyone accepts such views: Some ethicists think that temporally extended individuals are the most basic subjects of duties and/or rights, and that our parts are not, in and of themselves, subjects of duties and/or rights at all. If our parts do have this status, then the analogy with science is more complete, since in both domains, “parts” are more basic than “wholes” and “wholes” are more basic than “groups.” But either way, “wholes” are more basic than “groups,” and this idea is still noteworthy for present purposes.

In any case, as in science, we can agree that some beings are more basic than others in this sense while disagreeing about the details. For example, we might think that the moral status of nations fully reduces to that of their individual citizens. On this view, a complete theory of what individuals owe each other can fully explain all duties and rights at larger scales of morality. Yes, we might find it difficult to use interpersonal ethics alone to understand, say, what nations owe each other, but at least in principle, such an understanding is possible.

Alternatively, we might think that the moral status of nations depends on that of their individual citizens without fully reducing to it, since there can be “emergent values” at different scales of morality. On this view, a complete theory of what individuals owe each other is not able to explain all duties or rights at larger scales of morality. Instead, we need different kinds of ethics – interpersonal ethics, corporate ethics, international ethics, intergenerational ethics, and so on – to explain different duties or rights at different scales.

We might disagree about a range of other questions, too. For example, what kinds of interactions allow us to share duties or rights? We might think that the answer is a specific kind of cultural interaction, a specific kind of ecological interaction, or a specific interaction of another kind. We might also accept different views for shared duties (say, by focusing on shared intentions) than for shared rights (say, by focusing on shared interests or on bonds of care and interdependence). And of course, many different versions of each kind of answer are available. 

Additionally, when the rights of individuals conflict with the rights of collectives, how should we resolve those conflicts? We might think that we should prioritize individuals over the collectives that they help constitute, since the individuals are normatively primary. Alternatively, we might think that we should prioritize collectives over the individuals who help constitute them, for reasons that we will discuss in a moment. And of course, we might also think that the answer depends on further details, such as what does the most good overall.

But while these disagreements matter a lot, they do not undermine the theoretical, normative primacy of individuals (or their parts). We might think that collective duties or rights are more or less reducible, widespread, or important. Either way, we can agree that when moral agents or patients share duties or rights, they do not thereby lose their status as moral agents or patients. Instead, they simply have this status at multiple levels: at the more basic level as individuals (or parts), and at the less basic level as collectives (or individuals).

On another interpretation, to ask which beings are the primary units of moral analysis is to ask a practical, methodological question about which beings are the most helpful units of moral analysis in a given context. The general idea is once again the same as before: We can say that one kind of moral agent or patient is a more helpful unit of moral analysis than another when an analysis of the first kind of moral agent or patient is a better methodological starting point than an analysis of the second kind, for purposes of answering a particular moral question.

For example, even if the moral status of nations depends on that of their citizens, an analysis of the former is still a more helpful starting point than an analysis of the latter when thinking at global scales. And that would remain true even if the moral status of nations fully reduced to that of their citizens. That is, even if a complete theory of interpersonal ethics could fully answer questions about what nations owe each other in principle, theories of international ethics would still be more helpful for resolving conflicts between nations in most cases in practice.

If our spatial or temporal parts are units of moral analysis, then the same is true at this level as well. For instance, suppose that a strong version of this view is correct: Humans, like nations, are intergenerational communities of moral agents and patients who share territory, resources, and a common fate. Thus, the most basic units of moral analysis – the most basic subjects of duties and rights – are not temporally extended individuals, but rather temporally located brain regions that have particular thoughts and feelings in particular moments.

If such a view were correct, then the most helpful units of moral analysis would diverge from the most basic units of moral analysis at this level as well. That is, in the same way that nations need to interact primarily as nations when resolving international conflicts (and so their individual representatives need to occupy the perspective of a nation as a whole), humans would still need to interact primarily as humans when resolving interpersonal conflicts (and, so, their parts would need to occupy the perspective of an individual human as a whole).

As I discuss elsewhere, I personally find this picture plausible. It might be surprising that our spatial and temporal parts are distinct units of moral analysis, since they tend to be so intimately connected that we naturally experience them as unified, and so we use the first-person singular to refer to them. But insofar as they can have distinct thoughts and feelings, they count as distinct units of moral analysis, too. And while I will not insist on this picture here, it still provides a good illustration of the distinction that I mean to be making.

In any case, as in science, which kinds of beings are the more helpful units of moral analysis in this sense is a contextual matter. Yes, since humans naturally experience the world in terms of entities like plants, animals, tables, and chairs, we naturally think about such entities both scientifically and morally by default; for instance, when I interact with my colleagues, I navigate our relationships by thinking about what I owe them, not by thinking about what some of my spatial and temporal parts owe some of their spatial and temporal parts.

However, even if temporally extended individuals are generally the most helpful units of moral analysis for creatures like us, larger or smaller moral agents or patients can still sometimes play this role instead, depending on the context. Regarding larger moral agents or patients: As I have already suggested, it might make sense for cities to interact primarily as cities, for states to interact primarily as states, for nations to interact primarily as nations, and maybe even, if humans colonize the solar system, for planets to interact primarily as planets.

Regarding smaller moral agents or patients: To see why thinking about intrapersonal ethics can be useful, suppose that I have a home self and a work self who agree about the vast majority of matters, but who disagree about how to strike the right work-life balance. Now suppose that I need to decide whether to accept a promotion that will bring new opportunities as well as new responsibilities. In this case, it might be more helpful for me to ask what my home self and work self owe each other than for me to simply ask what I owe myself.

A similar analysis can sometimes apply to interpersonal relations, too. Suppose that my close friend has a drunk self and a sober self who compete for control over their behavior. Now suppose that their drunk self insults me and that, the next morning, their sober self expresses remorse. In this case, it might be more helpful for me to ask whether and to what extent their sober self and their drunk self are each responsible for this insult, rather than for me to simply ask whether and to what extent my friend is responsible for this insult.  

As in science, this discussion reveals an important sense in which individuals and ecological wholes can both be primary units of moral analysis. Individuals can be the more basic units of moral analysis, as well as the more helpful units of moral analysis for creatures like us in most contexts. However, ecological wholes can still be the more helpful units of moral analysis for creatures like us in some contexts, since when we think about ethics at ecological scales, we might need to think primarily in systemic terms, not individualist terms. 

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This distinction might allow us to resolve at least some disagreements between individualists and ecocentrists. For instance, when ethicists say that animals are the primary units of moral analysis (or when they make other statements along these lines), I think that they at least sometimes mean to be expressing the theoretical, normative idea that animals are the more basic units of moral analysis – that animals are part of what constitute ecological wholes, and the moral status of ecological wholes depends on the moral status of their individual members.

Meanwhile, when ethicists say that ecological wholes are the primary units of moral analysis (or when they make other statements along these lines), I think that they at least sometimes mean to be expressing the practical, methodological idea that species, ecosystems, and other such entities are the more helpful units of moral analysis for creatures like us when we think about ethics at ecological scales – that is, that we need to think primarily in systemic terms, rather than primarily in individualist terms, in order to answer moral questions at these scales.

Fortunately, these claims about moral primacy are mutually compatible and jointly plausible. In general, we should expect that the most basic units of analysis and the most helpful units of analysis in a given domain diverge for creatures like us. That is, when we use our scientific and moral methods to reveal the fundamental natures of reality and morality, we should expect that the basic building blocks that we reveal will differ from the tools that we used to reveal them – as well as from the tools that we continue to use to think and act in everyday life. 

I have presented one way of spelling out the details in ethics, though others are of course available too. In my view, parts of individuals are more basic than individuals, and individual members of nations, species, and ecosystems are more basic than these collectives or systems. But we still rightly think primarily about how to treat individuals by default in most individual and small-scale interactions, and we still rightly think primarily about how to treat nations, species, ecosystems, and other such entities by default in most large-scale interactions.

My hope is that this picture allows us to move towards an overlapping consensus between individualists and ecocentrists in ethics. In debates about whether individuals or ecological wholes are what matter, each party can defend an important idea: Individualists can argue that individuals are the most basic units of analysis as well as the most helpful units of analysis in most contexts, and ecocentrists can argue that ecological wholes are the most helpful units of analysis for answering particular kinds of moral questions at ecological scales.

Moreover, when we combine this discussion with other discussions, we might find that we have other reasons to move towards an overlapping consensus, too. For instance, as I noted in the introduction, one might accept a pluralist view about moral standing, either because one thinks that multiple properties or relations suffice for moral standing or, at least, because one thinks that they might suffice, given the evidence available. Such a view provides another route toward the idea that both individuals and ecological wholes are what matter.

However, my goal here was not to discuss the basis of moral standing or the basis for consciousness, sentience, agency, and other such features. My goal was instead to show that even if we assume that, say, consciousness, sentience, or agency is the basis of moral standing and that individuals, not ecological wholes, have these features, we can still accept that ecological wholes are the primary units of moral analysis in an important respect – as well as, potentially, that ecological wholes have a kind of irreducible value that takes priority in some cases.

I think that this picture also allows us to clarify some remaining disagreements between individualists and ecocentrists. Consider four examples that we encountered above. First, one might, of course, reject the idea that individuals are the more basic units of moral analysis or that ecological wholes are the more helpful units of moral analysis in particular contexts. If so, then this distinction allows one to object to that specific idea, rather than argue about whether individuals or ecological wholes are “what matter” in general, ambiguous terms. 

Second, we might agree about this general picture but disagree about exactly how the moral status of larger beings relates to the moral status of smaller beings. For example, when we ask about the moral status of species and ecosystems, are these questions mere shorthand for questions about the moral status of large numbers of individual animals, or do they also involve “emergent values” – ways of mattering at larger, more systemic scales that depend on, without fully reducing to, ways of mattering at smaller, more individual scales?  

Third, we might agree about this general picture but disagree about exactly which larger and smaller beings count as moral agents or patients. For example, we might disagree about whether particular kinds of collectives or systems count as unified moral agents or patients. We might also disagree about whether particular kinds of spatial or temporal parts of individuals count as distinct moral agents or patients. As a result, we might disagree about which outcomes are best or about which actions are right in a wide range of contexts.

Finally, and relatedly, we might agree about this general picture but disagree about exactly which beings to prioritize in cases of conflict. When the needs of individual humans or animals diverge from the needs of the nations, species, or ecosystems that contains them, we might disagree about whether to prioritize the more basic units of analysis or the more helpful units of analysis. This disagreement can have many sources, including disagreements about, for instance, whether ethics is primarily about promoting welfare or respecting rights.

Insofar as we disagree about these issues, it helps to clarify our cruxes of disagreement so that we can communicate effectively and so that we can all keep an open mind. After all, if I think that my views about all these issues stand or fall together, then I might be more likely to approach conversations about any particular issue with a “winner-takes-all” attitude. By decoupling my views about these issues while recognizing the links between them, I can compartmentalize disagreements and create more space for consensus- and coalition-building. 

Importantly, since some of these issues are contextual, we might find that our views about them change over time. For instance, an individualist might concede that ecological wholes are the most helpful units of analysis in large-scale interactions with wild animals at present, since we lack the ability to make reliable estimates about welfare at scale. But insofar as we improve our ability to make these estimates in the future, an individualist might insist that individual wild animals are the most basic and most helpful units of analysis at that point.

My strong suspicion, however, is that even in this optimistic scenario, ecological wholes would remain important units of moral analysis for individualists. That is, I expect that our moral thinking about species and ecosystems would be more like our moral thinking about nations, in that we would find it useful to assess our interactions in collective terms in some contexts and in aggregate individual terms in other contexts. In any case, for present purposes all that matters is that our views about these topics can and, perhaps, should change over time.

In closing, I have argued that individuals and ecological wholes can both be the primary units of moral analysis in an important respect, and thus individualists and ecocentrists have grounds for convergence that extend beyond the mere idea that ecosystems have instrumental value or that individuals have contributory value. The question is thus not whether individuals and ecological wholes are what matter. The question is instead how and why both are what matter, and what follows for how we should treat them in particular contexts. 

References

(1) There are a range of individualist views; prominent examples include the view that individual sentient beings (beings who can experience pleasure and pain) are the primary units of moral analysis, the view that individual agents (beings who can set and pursue their own goals) are the primary units of moral analysis, and the view that individual living beings (beings who can maintain and replicate themselves) are the primary units of moral analysis.. 

(2) See A Statement of Commitment to Ecocentrism for an explanation of ecocentrism’s central commitments and a list of those who subscribe to them.

(3) As I will use these terms, to be a moral agent is to be a being with duties, and to be a moral patient is to be a being with rights. For simplicity, I will assume that if a being has moral standing, then they count as a moral patient, with rights. But nothing that I say here will depend on this association between standing, patienthood, and rights.