Recommended Work

[Book] The Phenomenology of a Performative Knowledge System: Dancing with Native American Epistemology

In four years of undergrad philosophy, I never even considered dancing a topic worthy of epistemological inquiry. Reading Prof Shay Welch's book opened up a whole new world of possibilities. Through her book, Welch examines Native American dancing practices and how they relate to the Native American conception of epistemology. She argues that dance (especially Native and Indigenous dancing practices) are epistemic activities since they satisfy the conditions for expressing meaning and procedural truth-bearing set by Native epistemology. Indeed Welch advances a second 'stronger' claim and argues that dance is the best method to satisfy those conditions.

Aside from discussing the epistemic role of dance, Welch's book also provides an accessible analytic introduction to key concepts in Native American epistemology (see especially p 31-52). 

I want to draw particular attention to the second chapter, which presents the foundation of Native epistemology. Welch discusses two main features of Native epistemology that set it apart from ‘Western’ traditions:

Knowledge is ethical and relational. The purpose of epistemological inquiry is to guide the knower towards a life of harmony with one’s community. Hence related moral concerns must constraint the process of acquiring knowledge. Two central principles act as a moral guide in Native Epistemology (p. 34). First: the ‘Limiting of Question Principle’, which states that not all things are meant to be known (some facts might be distracting or harmful to one’s quest for harmony). Second: the ‘Moral Universe Principle’, which states that all facts are normative since they relate to a universe which is moral: “Whereas Western epistemology holds that facts are neutral, in Native epistemology, facts contain moral valence insofar as facts are often put to use for normative purposes, broadly speaking.” (p 34) Native epistemology is in stark contrast with the mainstream Western perspective which views knowledge as a commodity: “The relationship between individuals as knowers and knowledge in the mainstream Western worldview is one of ownership by way of individualism. [...] Such a lonely and self-centered relationship to knowledge is neither desirable nor possible within the Native American epistemological framework “ (p. 31)

1

Truth is a function of actions and procedures, meaning it relies upon successfully acting towards some goal (‘truthing’). To paraphrase Welch's example: in Native epistemology 'a book is blue' is true iff the book 'succeeds' in the action of being blue (i.e. is perceived as blue by those who see it). Note how this procedural approach implies that truth is a matter of degree rather than a binary property, as an action can be more and less successful, and its success is always relative to context.

Regards procedures, Welch writes:

"Within Native epistemology [...] procedures are substantial. There are protocols that must be followed for most activities related to undergoing praxes of knowing. [...] There are specific procedures for specific rituals that help us give thanks for the specific ways of knowing for different Native American and other Indigenous groups." (p 48)

Again this approach is at odds with the traditional western view that truth is propositional (the difference between propositional and procedural roughly maps to the difference in knowledge-that v knowledge-how).

2

‘Truthing’ is dynamic, has a strong communally phenomenological aspect (the process of knowing always happens from within the body and is the result of how we interact, as embodied beings, with our environment and other individuals), is bound by ethical and respect-based constraints, and relies on the capacity to introspect (and more broadly for an individual to explore their 'inscape').

Having outlined the conditions for truthing and communication under Native epistemology, Welch proceeds to show how dance, understood as embodied metaphor, can satisfy those conditions and therefore counts as a method of truthing (ch 3- 5). 

The following quotes give a flavour of how Welch draws the connection between dancing as a form of embodied metaphor and truthing: 

“Motion and emotion are directly related and therefore movement generates emotions which direct thinking—even and especially abstract thinking, which prompts understanding, which ultimately, I contend, leads to creating knowledge. This is how, in short, dancing is a form of Truthing.  [...]  In the case of dancing, because the dancer is able to enact intentions and metaphors into the images of her body, the expression of those embodied metaphors become enactive for the viewer as well. “ (p 131)

"Dancing is the activity of unmediated embodied metaphorical communications of lived experience in relation to a goal of Truthing to others concrete or abstract ideas regarding those lived experiences. And because it is a storytelling, dancing is an action of the core form of knowing and grounds of Truth in Native epistemology." (p 164)

Welch's argumentations are creative and interdisciplinary. The reader will encounter many concepts that are unlikely to feature in mainstream philosophy syllabuses. Note Welch's inquiry is not strictly confined to epistemological research; instead, she draws from dance theory, ethnography, embodied cognition, and Native studies. Even if a reader is sceptical of Welch's thesis, the variety of topics covered and creativity in arguments make her book well worth a read.