In conjunction with the last Insurrectionist Ethics lecture led by Assistant Professor Lacey J. Davidson, I would like to focus on the topic of epistemic responsibility. In Epistemic Responsibility and Implicit Bias (2020), Davidson and Prof. Nancy Arden McHugh offer a crucial examination of one fundamental aspect in the ongoing battle against marginalisation and oppression: epistemic responsibility. The concept of epistemic responsibility refers to the duties that epistemic agents (individuals capable of acquiring knowledge) have regarding their beliefs, their knowledge (or lack thereof), and their epistemic practices. Discussions surrounding epistemic responsibility try to answer the questions that open McHugh and Davidson’s paper:

"Are we responsible for our knowledge and how we act on that knowledge? Can we be responsible for what we don't know? Are we responsible when we act on biases of which we are unaware?" (p. 174).

These questions gain significance when considering the far-reaching implications of ignorance in the context of privilege and oppressive dynamics. Unknowingly acting on biases from a position of privilege can perpetuate the oppression of marginalised groups. Therefore, in light of the profound moral implications at stake, it becomes imperative to examine our responsibility, if any, in recognising and addressing our biases and privileges.

Implicit biases are beliefs that operate beneath our conscious awareness and influence our behaviour. Some philosophers assert that individuals cannot be held morally responsible for actions stemming from implicit biases due to a lack of awareness. While this perspective may seem compelling when focusing solely on individual moral responsibility, it overlooks the broader epistemic and social contexts within which individuals operate. To illustrate this, consider two scenarios:

• 1. Mark possesses an uncommon bias against people who wear black shoes, unconsciously attributing them less credibility.

• 2. Simon holds an implicit bias against women, unconsciously attributing them less credibility.

Both cases might initially appear to absolve Mark and Simon of moral responsibility for their actions rooted in implicit biases. However, closer examination reveals a stark contrast in the nature of these biases. bias is idiosyncratic and uncommon, possibly arising from personal quirks. In contrast, Simon’s bias is shared by many people, and is strictly linked to the social context in which Simon lives. It does not exist in a vacuum, but in the way people speak and behave towards women every day, since the day Simon was born. Simon’s bias is not that implicit after all, because it has been acquired over years of exposure towards explicit patriarchal dynamics. 

This distinction helps shed light on the responsibility attributable to epistemic agents. While Simon may not be individually responsible for his bias, he participates in the collective responsibility for it. As a member of an epistemic community that perpetuates such prejudices, Simon is morally obligated to acknowledge and combat them. In other words, he may not be blamed for acquiring them as an individual, but he has a responsibility to rectify them as a member of an epistemic community. 

Davidson and McHugh's argument skillfully uncovers the social dimension of biases, which is essential for comprehending the moral responsibility associated with them, often obscured by an excessive focus on personal responsibility. They state that "starting with individual moral responsibility can obscure both the stakes with respect to implicit bias and our individual and collective responsibilities to take action" (p. 176). Instead, they advocate for understanding implicit bias as one element within a broader array of mechanisms that perpetuate oppression, wherein individuals are to some extent shaped by their sociocultural context. This is where the global challenges and opportunities for engaging in epistemic responsibility lie.

Having emphasised the social dimension of oppressive bias, Davidson and McHugh delineate three practices, both individual and communal, that can help create virtuous epistemic agents capable of shouldering responsibility for their knowledge. These practices aim to develop epistemic virtues, which enhance our capacity as knowers, and epistemic friction, which exposes us to diverse viewpoints.

The first practice is ‘world-travelling’, first coined by María Lugones in Playfulness, "World"-Travelling, and Loving Perception (1987), involving the exploration of different spaces and environments to familiarise ourselves with diverse experiences and perspectives. This practice focuses on ‘intentionally’ pushing ourselves to expand our knowledge, and fosters the virtue of open-mindedness and introduces epistemic friction by exposing us to different viewpoints, challenging our biases and privileged positions.

The second practice is ‘progressive stacking’, which centres and amplifies marginalised voices within a community, ensuring equitable distribution of space and attention in a discourse. This practice cultivates epistemic humility, encouraging us to recognize our epistemic limitations. Paired then with epistemic friction, it enables us to confront our existing prejudices by acknowledging the reality of others' experiences.

The third practice involves ‘calling in’ and ‘calling out’ oppressive actions. Calling in entails pointing out the action while rebuilding the relationship with the person or group involved, whereas calling out is focused on stopping the action. Both practices promote epistemic diligence—the capacity to respond constructively to challenges like self-critique or requests for additional evidence.

While some may favour the more empathetic approach of calling in, Davidson and McHugh caution against dismissing the significance of calling out. Underestimating the importance of calling out may inadvertently protect oppressive identities, while at the same time silencing marginalised voices or policing their expression.

Davidson and McHugh's exploration of epistemic responsibility highlights the intricate interplay between individual and collective obligations in combating oppression. Recognising that implicit biases are not isolated phenomena but are deeply intertwined with societal structures, they call for a broader understanding of epistemic responsibility. Epistemic responsibility can also play an important part within the insurrectionist discourse: on one side, it stresses the importance and the right to call out within oppressive systems; on the other, recognising the epistemic responsibility of dominant groups ascertains the right to demand better epistemic practices. Readers are invited to further reflect on the connection between epistemic responsibility and insurrectionist ethics.