Professor Harris’ extensive and nuanced philosophical work can hardly be summarised in a short article. I want to draw attention to his meta-philosophy, which not only offers a new way of thinking about our philosophical practice, but also answers the question we ask as long as we live of how philosophy can have a concrete impact on real life. His criticism of the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition elucidates the nature of its disconnection from many actual human experiences and, furthermore, he then offers a new way for philosophy to reconnect with reality.

The core of Harris’ meta-philosophy claims that philosophy is born out of struggle and necessity– what he calls philosophia nata ex conatu. More accurately, philosophia nata ex conatu is a philosophy born out of our striving, as living organisms, towards a better condition while escaping suffering. In the history of philosophy, we find the idea of “conatus” to be particularly central to the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, and it indicates a predisposition to continue and enhance our existence. And so this philosophy is the action of that predisposition. Pronouncing this distinctive foundational feature of philosophical inquiry bears a number of remarkable consequences on Harris’ philosophy, which revolves around the idea of philosophia nata ex conatu. In the rest of the article, I explore these consequences in order to reach a better understanding of the Harrisian philosophical project at large. Let us take three distinguishing and instructive features that connect philosophy to how we live.

1. A philosophy that engages with society.

A philosophy born out of struggle, out of the desire to improve our existing conditions, cannot but be a philosophy that directly engages with society. The reason behind this implication is clear: for Harris, philosophy originates from the human desire to struggle away from suffering and towards freedom. Thus, it is not sufficient for philosophy to just observe or reflect on society: it must be a tool for action and change. In particular, Harris refers to action against oppressive systems, with a focus on racism. Since philosophical practice is rooted in enhancing our condition, philosophy necessarily ought to justify and support related struggles, including insurrectionist attempts at overthrowing oppressive systems. Therefore, Harris’ philosophy actively engages with human history and society. 

2. A philosophy centred around human rights.

Harris’ philosophia nata ex conatu places a revised notion of human rights at the centre of his system. When the core of philosophy consists of human beings possessing certain rights, then justifications for resistance to oppression necessarily follow when such existential rights are denied, as the driving forces of arguments and actions. In this respect, Harris’ philosophy diverges from the ‘‘Western’ tradition, where rights have been often considered an adjunct to theories rather than their starting point. This explains why many theories fail to provide adequate justifications for the insurrection of minority groups. Harris proposes to turn philosophy on its head and start over with rights and by necessity the right to insurrection. Commenting on the condition of enslaved people against static stances of precedent and demonstrable success, he firmly states:  

“The preponderance of evidence suggests that slave revolts or slave attacks on their masters fail; every woman and man engaged in such activities is acting against, on reflection, reasoned judgement, empirical evidence of probable success and utilitarian considerations. Almost no slave could have empirical evidence at their disposal to make such evaluations in any event. Nonetheless, they should revolt; they should escape” (p. 19).

Enslaved people should revolt to fight against suffering even if universal maxims or other ethical considerations made culturally available might appear to invalidate justification for it to the dominant modern eye. In understanding the right to and necessity of insurrection, people must change how they see. Harris especially emphasises the right to health, it essential to our ability to insurrect and secure a way out of oppression:

“The precondition for the possibility of knowledge, and a necessary for well-being, is health. Withouth health, nothing else follows… Philosophies born of struggle, I contend, should include corporeality of health and avowed valuations.” (p. 15)

3. Amoral universe.

Harris’ premises function in an amoral view of reality. We must fight against oppression as an incumbent right —for the arc of an amoral universe on its own will not bend towards justice, or injustice. In contrast with the ideas of Martin Luther King, Jr., Harris rejects any teleological momentum of a  society somehow destined to progress towards a more moral order. Arguing against historicism, Harris denies that the future is determined by the trajectory of the present: justice against oppression is not guaranteed. Instead he advocates for generating an awareness of the way society is in actuality and reclaiming the right to change it.

Harris considers suffering as totally unnecessary, unjustifiable, and unredeemable. The oppression faced by racial minorities is not to be romanticised as a necessary step in the moral arc of our society while waiting for a happy ending. Harris does not contend with the possibility of explaining suffering in these terms because suffering in itself has no purpose. He firmly vindicates the reality and gravity of suffering as a matter of fact which, in his philosophy, justifies the right to escape it and to fight oppressive systems – to insurrect. 

4. No absolute social ontology and no objective epistemology.

For Harris, the conatus, the constant striving towards well-being, also signifies the absence of epistemic objectivity. He contends that our beliefs depend on our subjective experiences as creatures striving to survive.  As a value pluralist, he rejects the holding of a single definition of what it is to be human. As a result, Harris dismisses the possibility of stable social categories: race, gender, and class are not real ontological categories or fixed social categories; they are at best useful descriptive tools. Everything depends on the individual’s context of survival. 

5. No single account of racism.

From points 3 and 4 follows Harris’ rejection of a unitary account of racism. The absence of an objective social ontology and objective epistemology disintegrates the concept of racist discrimination into the manifold and varying single experiences of different groups in varying contexts. H The amoral universe rejects any set, teleological, and singular narrative of racist oppression. We cannot give one definition of racism.  

Harris focuses upon and underlines the effects of racism: the misery endured by racial minorities as relief for the suffering there found cuts to the core motivation and justification for action. Racism, eventually described as a transfer of health from the oppressed to the oppressor, must be fought against by virtue of the conatus. In this context, we do not need to postulate the existence of metaphysically loaded social categories to describe racial discrimination; we instead focus on the living striving for better living conditions and the unequivocal right to insurrection when this is denied. Any moral system must allow for insurrection. 

Harris’ philosophical system is an impressive and thorough body of work that offers solutions to some of the most pressing issues of our time. With its elegant design, the system provides not only conceptual tools to advocate for the rights of marginalised beings, but also a framework for addressing a wide range of challenges our global society faces from the climate crisis to persistent global inequality. The system Harris develops from offering a realistic view of racial discrimination and the consequential right to insurrect has the potential to benefit a wide range of different–although connected– struggles for social justice.